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The purpose of this thesis is to appraise the costs and
benefits of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Depart-
ment of the Navy (.TJ N ) Configuration Management (CM) program
but only so far as to identify the present costs and bene-
fits and their relationship. CM costs occur in the imple-
mentation and application of policies, procedures, methods
and techniques while CM benefits are traceable in how the CM
policies affect overall Integrated Logistics Support ( 1 LS
)
of a major weapons system. The FA-18 Hornet aircraft program
wi 1 1 be studied and uti 1 ized as an example of the costs and
benefits associated with Configuration Management and Con-
trol. Primary focus for this thesis is Configuration Manage-
ment after Product Baseline has been established and the
weapon system is in full scale production and deployed to
the fleet. This chapter will provide a definition of
Configuration Management and Configuration Control together
with a brief history of configuration management, a state-
ment of the research problem, a statement of the research
objectives and a statement of the research methodology.
B. DEFINITION OF CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
Configuration Management as a concept or technique em-
bodies many critical and essential disciplines.
Configuration control, identification and accounting are
elements crucial to the overall objective of managing
advanced technology (see Figure 1). Indeed, these elements
are implicit in one widely used definition:
Configuration Management is the discipline of ensuring
that equipment or hardware meets carefully defined
functional, mechanical, and electrical requirements and
that any changes in these requirements are rigidly
controlled, carefully identified, and accurately recorded.
( Ret . 2: p. 313)
Configuration control can be defined as that function
responsible for the evaluation, approval, disapproval, and
implementation of approved changes to the original
Configuration Item (CI). It also refers to the procedure by
which changes to baseline configured items are proposed and
formal ly processed. Additional ly:
Configuration control involves the systematic evaluation,
coordination, and approval or disapproval of proposed
changes to the design and construction of a CI whose
configuration has been formal ly approved internal ly by the
company or by the buyer, or both. (Ref. l:p. 7)
Configuration identification is the process of identi-
fying specifications, hardware, and data available at. the
start of a system development. It is aiso the term used to
identify the currently approved or conditionally approved
technical documentation for a configuration item. More
f orma I 1 y , it:
refers to the technical documentation that identi-
fies and describes the approved product configuration
throughout the design, development, test, and production
tasks. It also applies to the identification of changes
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Configuration accounting is referred to as the reporting
and documentation activities involved in keeping track of
the status of a CI to include al 1 departures planned or made
from the configuration at all times throughout the entire
lifetime of the system. A more accurate definition is:
the s y s t e^natic recording and reporting of informa-
tion vital to the total configuration management task, a
listing of the approved configuration items, and the
listing of configuration identification approved for




Inherent to these formal and informal definitions are
words like discipline, systematic, precision and organiza-
tion which imply a formal, structured, and responsive
program dedicated to the configuration management objective.
The overal I objective of configuration management can be
stated as:
to guarantee the buyer that a given product is what
it was intended to be - functional ly and physical ly, as
defined by contractual drawings and specifications and
to identify the configuration to the lowest level ot
assembly required to assure repeatable performance,
quality, and reliability in future products of the same
type. (Ret. l:p. 7)
Five major goals are commonly an integral part of the
configuration management effort. They are:
1. Definition of all documentation required for product
design, fabrication, and test.
2. Correct and complete descriptions of the approved
configuration. (Including drawings, parts lists,
specifications, test procedures, and operating
manua Is.)
12
3. Traceability of the resultant product and its parts to
their descriptions.
4. Accurate and complete identification of each material,




Accurate and complete pre-evaluation control and
accounting of al 1 changes to product descriptions and
to the prodijct itself. (Ret. l:p. 7-9)
The amount of data to be identified, controlled and
accounted for can present an awesome task for a program
manager. While the data required to satisfy the stated goals
is usually available from the contractor in one form or
another via the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL), the
complexity of configuration management activities is often
beyond the scope of the program manager. Yet it is important
tor controlling a weapon system's ownership costs. Effective
control procedures should eliminate the nice-but-not-
necessary changes that keep designs in a state of turmoi i
,
lead to litigation, and unnecessarily burden the logistic
support system and training program. Configuration control
should not become so strict and burdensome as to excessively
arrest or inhibit the design maturation process. Change wi 1 I
always be necessary to enhance design attributes such as
reliability, maintainability, and producibility; to correct
latent design deficiencies discovered by ongoing fol low-on
test and evaluation (.FOT?<E) and production acceptance test
and evaluation (PAT&E) programs; to embrace applicable new
technology, and to accommodate changing tactics and new
threats. So long as changes are careful ly control led and
13
accounted for in the management system, they can
significantly enhance the utility of the weapon system.
(Ref. 4:p. 4-88)
C. BACKGROUND
During World 'War II aircraft rolling off the production
line were inconsistent. That is to say that while an
aircraft type was mostly hand made with some automated
manufacturing, each aircraft had subtle differences as a
result of the labor intensive manufacturing processes.
Systems were basic, sophistication was relatively low and
onl 1 ne maintenance of electronics and avionics systems was
minimal. As sophistication expanded during the post war
period, air bases and aircraft carriers devoted more space
and time to the support of airborne electronics, avionics,
power plants and structural sub-systems. Multiple
configurations of components often went undiscovered until
maintenance, troubleshooting, spares i n ter changeab 1 I i t y , and
supporting documentation presented compatibility problems.
The first formalized program to effectively deal with
uncontrolled changes was ANA Bui letin (Army, Navy and Air
Force) No. 390 issued by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD). This document introduced the Engineering
Change Proposal (ECP) which formalized industry guidelines
tor proposing aircraft changes. ANA Bulletin No. 39 1 A took
ECP's a step further by establishing a classification
priority and forcing the requirements on the electronics and
14
ground support equipment industries. In 1963, ANA Bulletin
445 was issued as a refinement by consolidating the previous
bui ietins into one document and further specified procedures
for the submission of ECP's for government approval.
Additionally, it included reliability and maintainability as
elements requiring consideration as Class 1 changes. The
present standard which superseded ANA Bui letin 445 is MIL-
STD-480A. Entitled "Configuration Control --Engineering
Changes, Deviations and Waivers", it represents the most
complete description of change control. (Ref. 1
:
p . 16) All
DOD activities involved in the procurement business
recognized the need for Configuration Management and a
proliferation of individualized instructions ensued. In 1962
the Air Force published AFSCM 375-1 entitled "Conf iguration
Management During the Development and Acquisition Phase". In
1964, DOD released DOD Directive 3200.9 covering the
requirements for concept formulation and contract
definition. Also in 1964, NASA published NPC 500-1, "Apollo
Configuration Management Manual". In 1965 the Army had AMCR
11-26 which was similar to that of the Air Force. The Navy
published many different documents specializing down to the
project level. While MIL-STD-480 represented the most
complete description of change control, it did not provide
implementation procedures, nor did it address any type of
systems approach to management. The frustrating result of
15
this proliferation of documents was that although each
agency had achieved a working system suited to its
particular needs, major contractors and sub-contractors now
had to contend with multiple requirements. That is, they
were similar in concept but encompassed a multitude of
variants in the details of significant tasks and reporting
requirements. (Ref l:p. 19)
Final ly, in 1968, OSD took the lead by promulgating a
cease and desist order and providing new guidance in an
attempt to achieve a conceptual ly more consistent degree of
uniformity in regard to policy, procedures, data forms, and
reports at al 1 interfaces within the DOD and between DOD and
industry. DOD Directive 5010.19 issued on July 17, 1968
established Configuration Management policy as it exists
today. DOD Instruction 5010.21 provides implementation
procedures for al 1 services and other DOD activities (see
Figure 2). While these guidelines are very specific and
fol lowed almost to the letter within the Navy, it will be
shown that there is significant room for variation
especially in the handling of Class II changes.
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The F/A-18 Hornet represents a quantum leap in
technological refinement and systems integration.
Consequently, a significant amount of on-line maintenance is
required for diagnostics and fault isolation in the complex
systems. Within the test environment at both the
16
— Director of Defense- Research and Engineenng
Memorandum on Configuration Management
. . . each Service shall limit its configuration management
regulations, manuals, standards, specifications, exhibits,
etc.. intended for contractual application to those formally
established prior to this date . . . April 1 3. 1 967 •^^
New Documentation and StandardsV
X
DOD directive 5010 19
configuration
management
Note. A "directive" establishes
—- DOD policy and an
"instruction" describes how
the policy is implemented.























Figure 2. DOD Configuration Management Standards
(Ref. 1)
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Intermediate and Depot levels of maintenance, technicians
are discovering that some Weapon Replaceable Assemblies
(WRA's) and Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRA's) are not
functioning as they should on Automatic Test Equipment
(ATE). Additionally, certain part numbers which should have
a relatively fixed configuration are showing up in multiple
configurations. Aside from the costs incurred to research
actual part numbers and their application, program officials
view this problem as a significant safety issue as well as a
source of degradation of operational readiness. This results
from incorrect orders by technicians and dysfunctional
maintenance programs on ATE.
E. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the costs
and benefits of the DOD/DON Configuration Management
policies and procedures, utilizing the F/A-18 program as the
research vehicle. The focus wil I be on post- product i on-
base 1 i n e configuration control in an attempt to discover why
several functional configurations are possible under one
part number.
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is derived from the
research objective and asks, "Has the Navy's Configuration
Management program for the FA-18 aircraft effectively
18
controlled the product baseline tor all designated
Configuration Items?" Secondary research questions are: (1)
Has the complexity ot configuration control problems out
stripped the present system's ability to handle them?; (2)
Is the present system inadequate and unable to capture the
current fast paced, high technology environment?; (3) Are
there existing methods used in private industry to better
manage configuration control?; (4) Who has ultimate
responsibility and authority for configuration management?;
(5) Does the Program Manager have the tools and expertise he
needs to manage configuration baselines?; (6) Is
responsibility for configuration management and control too
fragmented or inadequately defined?; (7) Are procedures we 1 1
defined and adequately enforced?; (8) Is configuration
management being delegated to a level beyond the scope of
the existing DON or Naval Air Systems Command ( NAVA i RSYSCGM
)
directives?; (9) Is the system too cumbersome to allow
effective and efficient information flow?; (10) Can second
and third tier vendors (manufacturers) circumvent the
present system to avoid what may be bureaucratic
bottlenecks?; (11) Do contractors fully understand the
Configuration Control requirement and the significant
logistics impact of a deviation from the requirement?
G. METHODOLOGY
This research effort will be conducted through the use
of applicable trade journals, periodicals and previous
19
research reports. Historical and current publications and
I iterature on relevant subjects have been uti I ized. Al 1
applicable Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of the
Navy (DON) instructions, directives and regulations have
been reviewed. Personal interviews were conducted at NAVAIR-
SYSCOM in the FA-18 Program Management Office (PMA-265) with
the Configuration Manager, the Assistant Program Manager for
Logistics (APML) and with personnel of Information Spectrum
Inc., under contract to the PMA for logistics matters.
Personal interviews with other key personnel in the FA-18
support structure include the NAVPRO at McDonnel 1 Aircraft
Corporation (MCAIR) in St. Louis, MO, the staff of
Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet ( COMNAVA I RPAC
)
San Diego, CA, the Naval Engineering Services Office (NESO)
at the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, CA. In addition,
phone conversations with the Aviation Support Office ( A S )
in Philadelphia, PA and with the DOD Configuration Manager
in Washington D.C. are other information sources.
20
I 1 . DQD/DON CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter will describe configuration management and
control as required within DOD and as applied to private
industry. A great deal of research has been done and much
has been written about configuration management. Many
directives, instructions and regulations govern DOD
configuration management. It is not the purpose of this
thesis to recapitulate the entire body of information
available on configuration management. Inefficiencies that
are observable in most weapon system procurements will be
addressed, particularly if they are visible in the FA-18
prog ram
.
All controlling documents center around MIL STD-480A.
While the central focus is the configuration disciplines of
control, identification and accounting, the most distin-
guishing feature is the separation of Class 1 and Class 1
1
changes. Conversations with logisticians and configuration
managers indicate that the definition of a change and a
determination as to which category it falls into is often
vague and ambiguous and subject to time, fiscal, and
political pressures.
21
B. DOD/DON CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
Al I DOD components, including the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Military Departments and Defense
Agencies, are governed by DOD Directive 5010, 19 dated 01 May
1979, entitled "Configuration Management". This directive
states general poficy for the heads of all DOD components in
the application of configuration management practices. In
addition, it directs the Secretary of the Navy to maintain
the Joint DOD Services/Agencies Regulation, the purpose of
which is to:
.prescribe uniform policies and guidance for the
Mi 1 itary Services and Defense Agencies (hereafter referred
to as DOD components) responsible for implementation of
Configuration Management within the Department of Defense.
(Ret. 5:p. 1-1)
The applicability of this instruction is extremely broad in
an attempt to capture al 1 possible DOD demands. At the same
time, it recognizes that no single common set of configura-
tion management procedures will meet every DOD need. It
further states:
Due to variations in requirements, organisations,
industrial commodity areas, and working relationships, the
military specifications (MlLSPECs) and standards (MIL
STDs ) (prescribed herein) will be tailored to recognize
peculiar program requirements. However, optimum uniformity
throughout DOD and between DOD and Industry components can
be achieved by Ser v i ce / Agency adherence to the policies
outlined herein coupled with reasonable contractual
application of the prescribed M I L-SPECs / STDs and
applicable Data Requirement Descriptions ( DD Forms 1664)
for citation in the DD 1423 Contract Data Requirements
List. ( Ref . 5: p. 1-1
)
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The concept of standards and specifications as to their
application and enforceability is often misconstrued. As
utilized above, the DOD perspective of a standard to
describe products or services generally falls into three
categories. A standard can be written as a set of technical,
dimensional, or performance requirements. It can be an
accepted process or procedure. It can also be a common
product identified as a preferred item in a situation. These
standards should not be confused with those "standards"
mandated by law or regulation at the federal, state, and
local levels which are used to establish requirements for
meeting safety, environmental protection, welfare and other
national objectives. (Ret 6) A representative sample of
standards which should be contractual ly specified is
provided in Appendix A.
Since a standard or specification as defined above does
not carry the weight of the law except as enforced through a
contractual vehicle, and in view of the flexibility provided
by the Joint DOD Ser v i ces / Agenc i es Regulation, the various
Systems Commands within the Navy have been delegated the
responsibility of generating more specific guidance for the
application of standards and specifications to configuration
management. Of particular interest to this study is NAVAIR
Instruction 4130.1 A, the Configuration Management Manual .
The foundation for this instruction, which provides specii [c
guidance to all programs under NAVAIRSYSCOM cognizance, is
M I L-STD-480A which supplies change control guidance to both
DOD and private contractors. Structurally, both documents
are broken down into the major disciplines outlined in
chapter one of this study. However, a recurring theme, one
of significant consequence in the FA-18 acquisition, is the
requirement within al 1 aspects of configuration management,
to categorize changes into two classes. Class 1 changes are
the most consequential in terms of costs and are called
Engineering Change Proposals or ECP's. Class II changes are
simply all other changes that do not qualify as Class I's.
It will be shown that these two classes are extremes in the
world of change and the criteria for their respective
definitions is often more ambiguous than precise. In order
to understand the full significance of this division, a
brief overview of both categories is necessary.
C. CLASS 1 ECP'S
Class 1 ECP's are those changes which are necessary, or
which offer significant benefit to the government. (Ref.
7:p. 1V-8) Such changes are those required to:
1. correct deficiencies,
2. make a significant effectiveness change in operational
or logistics support requirements,
3. effect substantial lire cycle cost savings, or
4. prevent slippage in an approved production schedule.
24
While these criteria appear rather subjective, MIL-STD 480A
presents a more objective check list lor the classification
of engineering changes (see Appendix B: Check List for
Classifying ECP's). More precisely, an engineering change is
classified Class 1 when one or more of the factors listed
are affected. Once it has been determined that a change is a
Class 1 ECP, it must be ful ly justified and documented by
the manufacturer to the NAVA I RSYSCOM Change Control Board
Secretariat, Code AIR-01D4. MIL-STD 480A provides a series
of applicable justification codes. After justification and
preparation in the format specified by NAVAIR Instruction,
it is processed through the NAVAIR chain of command as
illustrated in Figure 3. Class I changes have priority
assignments with specified time allowances for the
processing of more critical changes. An Emergency ECP time
allowance is 24 hours; an Urgent is 15 calender days; a
Routine is 45 calendar days. From the processing diagram it
can be seen that many potential bottlenecks can exist due to
time, fiscal and political constraints. The most notable of
which was the decision by Navy Secretary John Lehman to
personally approve all ECP's for major weapon systems.
Though this is undoubtedly an extreme, and wi I 1 not continue
in the future, many other factors are at work preventing
timely processing of Class I ECP's. The average processing
time is currently running approximately 24 months for a
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routine ECP. (.Ref. 8, 9, tO) The easiest way to force a
Class I through the system is to tag it as a Safety Item.
For Safety ECP's, processing is without hesitation. For all
others, however, funding seems to be the most difficult
constraint. (Ref. 9)
Figure 4 of f^ rs a sampling of funds available for
different types of changes and modifications, and as with
al I appropriated funds in DOD, each must be budgeted. There-
fore, surprises in the form of Class I ECP's can have a
significant impact on fiscal allocations thereby requiring
action on an ECP to be postponed until actual funding is
available. If transfer funding cannot be agreed to, and a
supplemental appropriation cannot be justified to Congress,
a delay of up to a year or more can be expected. Political
infighting over protection of scarce resources is a way of
life for all program managers. An ECP is just a proposal
until it is funded and approved. Upon approval, an ECP
becomes incorporated into the production I ine for al 1 future
items, and/or becomes part of the Navy Modification Program
for retrofit on deployed units.
D. CLASS II CHANGES
If Class I ECP's are difficult to approve but the
easiest to trace, Class I 1 changes are easy to obtain
approval but the most difficult to trace. Class II
27
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Figure 4. Funding Matrix
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engineering changes are generally defined as those changes
which do not fall under the Class I definition. (Ret. 7: p.
IV-9) In other words, any change that is not a Class I, is a
Class II. An alternative definition might be one that dis-
tinguishes a Class I I engineering change as having no effect
on form, fit, function or cost. All others then would be a
Class I. An example of a Class 11 engineering change might
be a change in documentation (correction of errors, addition
of clarifying notes or views), or a change in hardware
(e.g., substitution of alternative material) which does not
effect any factor listed in the definition of a Class I
change (see Appendix B). It is hard to imagine a change
which does not affect at least one of the Class i decision
factors. It will be shown that most changes have at least
some effect on publications.
The approval authority for a Class 1 I engineering change
is at a much lower level than that for a Class I ECP. NAVAIR
Instruction 4130. 1A states in part:
Unless otherwise specified by contract, the only Govern-
ment review of Class 11 changes will be for concurrence in
classification. This function is performed by the NAVPR0,
DCASMA, NTR or other designated Government Representative
servicing the contractor's plant. (Ref. 7:p. IV-9)
Implied in this statement of responsibility is a limited
review of engineering applicability. The variability in this
review is subject to many ractors such as:
1. the number of qualified engineers assigned to the
Government Plant Representative office,
2. time available to perform the review,
19
3. talent of the individuals assigned to do the review
including their depth of understanding CM objectives.
4. working relationships between plant rep engineers and
contractor engineers,
5. pressure from program management (.both Navy and
Corporate) to keep changes at the Class 1 1 level for
reasons to be discussed in fol lowing sections,
6. Funding constraints.
This loose delegation of authority extends beyond the prime
contractor of a major weapon system like the FA-18, to
second and third tier vendors and creates a very shal low
approval chain which requires limited if any formal
documentation. The potential to lose track of these
"informal" changes is great. In many cases, the only place a
change might be visible is on the engineering drawings
t hemse 1 ves
.
Many of the lower level vendors manufacture items with
multiple applications in and to different weapon systems. It
is fundamental to the Engineering discipline that iterative
changes take place to enhance performance objectives such as
Reliability, Maintainability or Survivability. Indeed,
Figure 5 which illustrates recent Class II change activity
at MCAIR, provides some idea as to the magnitude of the
change process.
Given the loose requirements for approval of Class I I
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accounting function is limited in its ability to track these
changes and properly document them.
E. GOVERNMENT MOTIVATIONS (REPRESENTATIVE VIEWPOINTS AND
ATTITUDES)
The primary purpose of configuration management, at the
bottom line, is to ensure the continuing logistics
supportability of systems in the government inventory. (Ref.
ll:p. 21) It should be obvious by now that significant
constraints are placed on changes qualifying as Class I's.
Consequently, almost through default, Class II engineering
changes are the politically preferred method. Considerable
time and energy are expended by Navy managers and by
Contractors to rationalize an engineering change into a
Class 1 i category rather than the burdensome, tedious and
expensive Class I ECP process. This is not to say that
changes are intentionally mis-classified. It does show that
there is no middle ground for managers to work in. A Class
I I change can avoid a corpulent bureaucracy. In many cases
they can sidestep sensitive funding issues, and approval can
take a relatively negligible amount of time. A class I ECP,
while extremely unwieldy, inflexible and political, ioes
provide uncomprom i sed accounting procedures (see Figure 6).
This is critical when the engineering function (cognizance)
is transferred from the manufacturer, (as at Initial
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process) to the government. It will be shown that with the
proliferation of Class II changes and the deficiencies in
documentation, the transfer of engineering cognizance is
much more problematic.
The possibility of system performance degradation
resulting from installation of incompatible components is an
acute concern in the operating forces. (Ret. 1 3
:
p . 52) This
observation was made in the summer of 1979 by the then
Configuration Status Accounting (CSA) Planning Officer at
Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C. However, the
same concerns are prevalent today with the operators and
raaintainers of FA-18 aircraft. The possibility of a
technician ordering and receiving an improperly configured
item is very real in the fleet and currently requires full
time management at al I levels of the support structure to
solve these recurring problems. It will be shown that
inddequdciea within Navy Management Information Systems has
generated a proliferation of independent data management
systems. These systems are a statement from managers at
various levels within, and in support of the FA-18 program,
that a means to track the numerous component configurations





CONF I GURAT 1 ON MANAGEMENT I NTERFACE
A. OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an
understanding of how private industry views Configuration
Management, how they interface with Government policies and
directives, and to take a brief look at methods utilized by
contractors to achieve configuration control objectives.
The myriad of controlling documents required by DOD
policy create a substantial burden on the corporate Con-
figuration Management support system. Because configuration
management is linked with company-wide activities (engineer-
ing, production, product support, etc.), an increased aware-
ness of fundamental configuration management control systems
will serve to enhance communications between configuration
management and interfacing departments.
The present environment for technology development is
fast paced and highly iterative in that changes and new
developments appear with unprecedented frequency. An effec-
tive, efficient and accessible management information system
is fundamental to the "management" of complex systems.
The contract, which is the primary controlling vehicle
for configuration management, can have a significant impact
on the entire acquisition program. In the government/
35
contractor interface activity, the accepted technical data
baseline is identified, maintained, and controlled via the
contract, which essential ly covers the del ivery of hardware
(and software); the content and delivery of data; and/or the
accomplishment of certain services. The principal contract
elements, the Statement of Work (SOU), the Contract Data
Requirements List (CDRL), the systems specifications, the
general provisions, the identification of applicable docu-
ments and the application of the Federal Acquisition Regula-
tions (FAR's - formerly the Defense Acquisition Regulations,
and before that, the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
or ASPR) clauses al 1 may invoke requirements affecting the
technical data baseline through acquisition management sys-
tems (both the hardware and the non-hardware types), data
item descriptions (DID's) or other government generated
constraints. (Ref. 14:p. 38)
B. RESPONSIBILITIES
It should be pointed out that while MIL-STD-480A
addresses the task elements of configuration management
(identification, control, status accounting and auditing),
little emphasis is placed on management. In the eyes of
many, and too often in practice, configuration "management"
equates to merely performing the task elements. To put it
another way, configuration managers are often nothing more
36
than "configuration recorders", required merely to track and
record the accomplishment of various program activities
without participating in the initial decisions about the
task. It may be prudent to look at Configuration Management
from another point of view; as involving three elements:
administrative, clerical, and technical management, with an
emphasis on technical management. (Ref. 15:p. 55)
Configuration management grew from and is still
essentially a sub-discipline of engineering. It is generally
accepted that configuration managers who are engineers tend
to do the best job. This attitude stems from the interface
required between the configuration manager and engineering
throughout the development of the program. There seems to be
less of a credibility gap when dealing engineer to engineer,
and the depth of understanding of technical problems tends
to be greater. (Ref. 15:p. 55) There is a tendency in many
cases for the program manager to turn to engineering for al
1
things technical, including technical management. The result
in many cases is that engineering is expected to provide
configuration (technical) management as well as the primary
function of ensuring item performance. This dilution does
not benefit either discipline. (Ref. 15:p. 56) Nevertheless,
the engineer or engineering team having engineering
cognizance over the functional and physical characteristics
of the end item or CI, remains the most accurate and
37
reliable source of information relevant to the applicability
of data, drawings or performance specifications of an item.
Within MCAIR, the Configuration Manager is a Subsystem
Manager. As such he acts as a deputy program manager in
matters relating to CM and is responsible to make known any
problems wnich require program management decisions to
appropriate higher levels of MCAIR FA-18 Program Management.
Similar to other subsystem Managers, the Configuration
Manager remains functional ly in the Engineering Department.
(Ref. 16:p. 6) The authority, prestige or influence of this
manager, based on his positional relationships, could be
counter productive to the fundamental configuration objec-
tives. He is expected to "function" within engineering while
maintaining loyalties to program management. This instilled
conflict could, in essence, render the Configuration Manager
ineffective.
Managing the copious amounts of data generated from the
engineering function is another matter. A configuration
definition is usually expressed by a set of operational
drawings and specifications. These drawings and specifica-
tions define an operational item or system and are termed
the technical data baseline for that item or system. Identi-
fication and verification of the data, documents, drawings
and specifications that make up the technical data baseline
is essential to baseline integrity. In the government/
38
contractor interface activity, the accepted technical i a 1 i
base 1 i ne is i dent i f i ed , ma i n ta i ned , and cont roll ed via t tie
contract. As stated in section A ot this chapter, the
principal contract elements may invoke requirements which
could affect the technical data baseline. Confidence in the
integrity of a technical data baseline is a crucial
ingredient to credible Integrated Logistic Support ( I L S ) of
the weapon system. Confidence in the technical data baseline
can only be as strong as the confidence in the methods and
procedures used to generate the information by which the
baseline was established. Consequently, contract makeup can
have a significant impact on the baseline. In today's
technical environment, verification of the baseline can be
complicated by the following factors:
1. Large volume of tasking documents that impact base-
i i nes
;
2. Large volume of data-generating instructions, many o t
which are duplicative or inconsistent with each other
and hence confusing to a contractor dealing with more
than one government office;
3. Contract disparity;
4. Contract internal inconsistency;
5. Inordinate requirements imposed but semi-visible (FAR.
multi-tier references); and the
6. Attempt to control data product separate from task.
(Ref. 14:p. 40)
Figure 7, excerpted from the lists of Data Item Descriptions
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representative of a typical DUD contract, illustrate the
over abundance of direction on the same subject that is
available to be imposed on a contractor. Much ot the
direction may be essential ly the same in intent but vary
substantially in makeup. LRef. 1 4 : p . 4 1 J While not all of
these constraints may be invoked on a given contract, the
complexity of establishing the integrity of the baseline can
be seen. In addition, any variation in interpretation by
government or contractor representatives from one constraint
to a similar one could have a negative effect on the
confidence level built through use of the former constraint.
In essence, while attempting to control the generation of
data, managers lose sight ot what is being done toward
controlling the corresponding creative task effort. In other
words, whiie one faction is trying to manage and control
data products, someone else is managing and control I ing
those tasks that generate the data. A Management Information
System (MIS) capable of integrating these functions is
essential. Total traceability ot configuration from the shop
floor through the using activity's (customer's) operational
environment should be accompl ished by interrogating the
appropriate data base. Unfortunately, the corporate and
government data bases usually do not integrate well, arid
consequently this is easier said than done.
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C. FA- 18 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN
Considerable variation exists within individual
corporate structures for dealing with the preponderance of
directives, regulations and specifications previously
sighted. Typically, contracts for individual programs
specify a requirement for the prime contractors to publish
their configuration management goals, objectives, policies
and procedures via a management plan. In the case of the FA-
18 prime contractor, McDonnell Aircraft Company introduced
the "FA-18 Program Configuration Management Plan" as
foil ows
:
The F-18 Contract together with Addendum TS-169 to AR-59B
and MR-18 "General Management Requirements for Project
Management for F-18 Weapon System" establish the
requirements for Configuration Management (CM). This plan
defines the CM system which will be applied by MCA 1 R to
the F-18 Program during FSD, Pilot Production and Produc-
tion. This plan has been prepared to the format of Data
Item Description (DID) DI-E-2035. (Ref. 16:p. 1)
The configuration management plan attempts to describe in
relative detail MCAlR's i ernal guidelines to be utilized
to satisfy specific contractual requirements for the
management of the following CM elements and functions:
- Configuration Identification
- Configuration Control
- Change Classification, Preparation and Processing
- Requests for Deviations and Waivers
- Software Configuration Management
42
- Configuration Status Accounting
- Interface Management and Control
- Configuration Audits
- Subcontractor Control
- Interface with Northrop
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate and define the diversity of
documents stipulated in the FA-18 Program Configuration
Management Plan. It is important to realize, especially in
the case of Class 1 I Engineering Changes, that the internal
procedures outlined in the plan are unique to MCAIR and
would be different for other defense contractors. (Ref. 8)
Of particular interest is the predominance of Class I I
documents and those documents used for minor deviations and
waivers. Where approval authority is required for Class I I
engineering changes, and minor deviations and waivers, it is
provided on site by the organization having plant
cognizance. In this case a Navy Plant Representative Office
(NAVPRO), but in other cases the authority could be an Air
Force Plant Representative Office (AFPRO) or a Defense
Contract Administration Services Plant Representative Office
(DCASPRO). It is also important to note that only government
concurrence in the classification decision (which would
imply approval) is required for a Class II authorization.
The complexity of the corporate organization, the internal
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Figure 8. MCAIR Configuration Control Documents
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EO - Engineering Order - The EO is a document which authorizes
incorporation of a change in manufacturing before the
drawing is revised. It is physically attached to in-house
copies of the drawing. The drawing must be revised within
one year. It is written against individual drawings.
DCN - Drawing Change Notice - The DCN is a DOD-STD 1 00B revision
authorization document and is referenced in the revision
block of the drawing. It describes the changes made to the
drawing. It is written for each drawing revision and in-
house is attache^ to the drawing until the next revision.
EJS - Engineering Job Sheet - The EJS is a document which is
written for changes which affect more than one drawing or
engineering group. It contains a brief description of the
change and lists the drawing affected. It is similar to the
DOD-STD 480A DD1 692 form.
Vendor RCP/CCP - Requirements Change Proposal/Configuration
Change Proposal - The RCP/CCP is used for subcontractor
changes which are not dispositioned at the vendor location
by the local government representative. It is similar to the
DOD-STD 480A, DD Form 1692.
VAR - Variation - The VAR authorizes a temporary departure from
an individual drawing and is physically attached to in-house
copies of the drawing.
AMS - Authority for Material Substitution - The AMS provides the
authority to substitute from raw material callouts on the
drawing
.
DD1694 - Request for Deviation - The standard DOD-STD 480A form.
The contractor uses it for RFD's submitted by
vendors/subcontractors
.
STD Parts - Company Standard Parts - These are changes to company
standard and are used on all company programs. Therefore,
STD Parts Changes are counted separately. STD Parts are
referenced directly on the drawing and are nonstandard
parts (i.e. non-military).
M&P Specs - Material and Process Specifications - These are non-
standard (i.e. non-military) specifications. They are
referenced on the drawing and are used on all company
programs. They are counted and authorized separately.
NR - Nonconformance Reports - Used in the waiver process.
NRR - Nonconformance Report, Repetitive
MRR - Material Review Record (Ref. 8)
Figure 9, MCAIR Class II Change and
Minor Deviation Formats
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culture, and the political power structure are essential
elements for Navy Configuration Managers to study and ful ly
understand if they are to effectively interface with the
corporate environment and provide accurate and cost
effective Configuration Control.
D. CONTRACTOR MOTIVATIONS (VIEWPOINTS AND ATTITUDES)
Defense Contractors are in business to make a profit in
order to perpetuate the we 1 1 being of the company and there-
fore the people who make up the company. An externality to
the corporate environment is an atmosphere of perpetual
political change inherent to the Government (in this case
the customer) which dictates that short and long term Cost/
Benefit decisions be made and reviewed continuously. Profit
regulated business arrangements necessitate a constant
search for cost saving methods and efficient manufacturing
techniques while at the same time providing state-of-the-art
technology. This seemingly impossible juggling act is
responsible for great strides in the development of tools
and techniques utilized for efficient technical management.
Efficiency and flexibility are the name of the game for
keeping pace with changing Defense priorities.
Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Computer Aided
Manufacturing (CAM) have come of age and automation has
entered the change control arena. The capability exists to
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effect functional and physical design changes so rapidly,
that change decisions must be made quickly. Otherwise, con-
trol of the product configuration can be lost, along with
consequent cost control, inventory control and profit.
Management information systems capable of integrating and
tracking the high speed design process to facilitate CM
exist within private industry. Unfortunately, MIS external
to the corporate environment (within the government
components and agencies) does not keep pace. Present day
paperwork cycles are becoming ineffective and intolerable.
(Ret. 17:p. 32) This can be especially true when integrating
software and hardware requirements at the micro-circuit
level. It will be shown that a seemingly insignificant
change in a circuit path of a micro chip or a subtle command
change imbedded in a software test program can have
detrimental short and long term effects for the user if the
changes are undocumented or the information is buried within
the contractor engineering department and not passed to the
customer in the proper manner.
Corporate America has been forced to take the lead in
automated data management and management information
systems, due to an increasing demand for data by the
customer. An extraordinary amount of data is generated as a
result of contractual requirements. Unfortunately, while the
government pays a substantial amount of money for this data,
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much of the information is not utilized. In fact, a great
deal of the technical data package is obsolete before it is
even reviewed. Significant cost savings (time, money and
manpower) could be realized by reviewing the contractual
Standards and Specifications for program relevance prior to
placing the contractual burden on both the contractor and
government program management.
A new frontier in configuration and data management is
presenting itself. The challenge is to define it and apply
innovation and imagination to the solution of its problems.
To evolve with the times, it will be necessary to use the
technology of tomorrow to manage the products of tomorrow.
(Ref. 1 7 : p . 37) The complexity of future CM will require an
understanding and a dedicated commitment from professional
configuration managers that present civil service and
military training and rotation do not provide.
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The FA-18 Hornet represents a quantum jump in the
application of advanced technology to the idea of a truly
versatile, multirole, carrier-based tactical aircraft
designed to perform both fighter and attack missions. The
program has been a considerable source of controversy and
even as recently as 1982 there was substantial pressure to
terminate it in favor of other solutions to the operational
requirement. It has been said that the program was not
terminated more as a result of good fortune than good
management because technical development problems, parochial
interests, the decreasing priority of defense spending and
adverse economic conditions combined to produce a particu-
larly hostile environment for a new weapon system program.
tRef . 18:p. 1) In reality, good management may have been a
key element in keeping the program alive.
The FA-18 was destined to be a configuration control
challenge right from the start. Conceived as a light weight
fighter out of the Navy's VFX (Experimental Carrier Fighter)
program, a derivative of the aircraft would be designed to
provide air to ground attack capability, changing the pro-
gram designation to VFAX (Experimental Carrier Attack
Fighter). It is not the intent of this thesis to document
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the political issues affecting FA-18 procurement. Suffice it
to say that Full Scale Development (FSD) contracts awarded
in 1976 provided for 11 FSD aircraft to be followed by 400
F-18's and AOO slightly different A-18's. Continuing Con-
gressional and DOD pressure for commonality changed this to
800 dual mission "strike-fighters" which differed according
to mission by operational level configuration changes. (Ref.
18:p. 5) What emerged was a "software programmable air-
craft", capable of providing the flexibility to readily
adapt to new weapons, new technology, and new mission appli-
cations. Uncertainty generated by this flexibility would
provoke lengthy discussions on how to tactically employ this
type of adaptable technology. Indeed, as late as 1982, it
was not certain what the actual designation of the aircraft
wou 1 d be
.
The real beauty of this adaptable technology was the
expediency with which the weapon system could be recon-
figured to meet changing requirements dictated by expanded
missions and altered threats. In regard to the latter ele-
ments, a Comptroller General report stated:
As a rough generality, performance requirements for
strategic programs undergo less frequent modification than
do tactical programs. One of the principal reasons for the
fluctuations in tactical weapon system programs seems to
be the changes in mission concepts during the development
phase and their relationship to other programs, either in
inventory or under development. (Ref. 19:p. 13)
50
No aircraft weapon system is isolated from the impact of new
weapons and capabilities which can be added to upgrade
mission capabilities. The state of the art demonstrated in
the FA-18 makes it highly susceptible to change. Consequent-
ly, change management has become an imperative requiring a
more disciplined systematic approach. Present configuration
management policies and procedures, while intricate in some
respects, don't go far enough in others.
B. CLASS I ECP LOGISTICS PLANNING
Program Management is often referred to as the "manage-
ment of change", which it certainly is in the broadest
sense. However, all too often this broad interpretation of
the management of change has not properly included change
management. In this more limited context, change management
is one of the major functions of configuration management
and refers to the control of engineering changes or Engi-
neering Change Proposals (ECP's). (Ref. 20:p. 1) In the case
of Class I ECP's a more accurate terminology might be ECP
management
.
Within the FA-18 program, ECP management is coordinated
by the program management office in accordance with current
directives. The Assistant Program Manager for Logistics
(APML), under the auspices of NAVAIR code AIR-04, assumes
the responsibility for reviewing and assessing the short
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and long term impact of the ECP on each I LS element. A go or
no go recommendation is made based on this suppor tab i 1 i ty
evaluation. A suppor tab i I i ty profile is thus established for
the Configuration Item (CI). Since each FA-18 is considered
a CI (apart from subsystem CI's within the aircraft), the
suppor tab i 1 1 ty profile for the different airframe
configurations, known as "lot numbers", becomes the basis
for logistics support in the post production environment.
Logistics support during the production phase of the
acquisition process falls on support activities such as ASO
and NESO, which assume engineering cognizance after IOC.
Prior to IL3C, the support activities perform logistics plan-
ning using a process entitled Logistics Support Analysis
(LSA). LSA is defined as:
.an iterative analytical process by which the logistic
support necessary for a new system is identified and eva-
luated. LSA constitutes the application of selected
quantitative methods to (1) aid in the initial determina-
tion and establishment of logistics criteria as an input
to system design, (2) aid in the evaluation of various
design alternatives, (3) aid in the identification and
provisioning of logistic support elements, and (4) aid in
the final assessment of the system support capability
during consumer use. LSA is a design analysis tool
employed throughout the early phases of system development
and often includes the maintenance analysis, life-cycle
cost analysis, and logistics modeling. (Ref. 21:p. IZ)
An important output of LSA is the identification of and
justification for logistic support resources: spare/repair
part types and quantities, test and support equipment, per-
sonnel quantities and skill-level requirements, and so on.
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Wit. h this kind of information available in an "iterative
process" from the beginning of development, it is signifi-
cant to realize that the LSA is not considered a configura-
tion management document. (Ref. 8, 9, 10)
Since the LSA is a working process for the support
activities, and since support activities do not become
involved in the ECP process until after the fact, logistics
planning for any ECP is always a tail end process and always
lead time away. Support activities such as NESO would rather
the change process be proactive than reactive. If logistics
planning could be started earlier in the ECP process, LSA
parameters could be modified and evaluated, a more manage-
able transition of the sup portability profile could be
effected, and more cost effective support trade-off options
could be made available.
While those ECP's that were essential to FA-18 program
success were properly recognized, justified and funded in
accordance with the Configuration Management Plan and the
spirit of M I L-STD-480A , a method of integrating the LSA
process with the configuration control procedures would
provide a significant enhancement to overal I CM. Within the
FA-18 program, a move is underway to do exactly that.
C. THE CLASS II EXPEDIENT
Class II engineering changes take place almost exclu-
sively within the confines of MCAIR. In chapter II! the
S3
Class 11 approval process was delineated for the FA-18
program. Government concurrence for a Class 11 rating, or
approval for a minor deviation or waiver is provided by the
NAVPRO which properly resides on site within MCA 1 R facili-
ties. The NAVPRO provides an impressive range of oversight
activities. The NAVPRO St. Louis organization chart is pre-
sented in Figure 10. In order for the NAVPRO to deliver the
type of oversight specified by its charter, it must actively
and effectively interface with the corporate organization,
structure and culture. Engineering cognizance covers a broad
technical spectrum and requires a substantial engineering
staff to keep pace with the number and type of Class I I
changes and minor deviations and waivers submitted. Toward
this task, NAVPRO engineers have typically demonstrated a
high degree of talent. However, time constraints and the
very nature of their charter cause them to view a potential
change more for functional issues rather than CM issues.
Class 1 1 specifications that prescribe the submission of
a proposed change for concurrence in classification, leave
the presentation format to the discretion of the manu-
facturer. The FA-18 Configuration Management Plan specifies
the MCA IR change documents to be utilized for the Class II
process (see Figures 8 and 9). Many such documents are
reviewed by NAVPRO engineers daily and this activity is






















When a document such as an Engineering Job Sheet ( E J S ) or an
Engineering Order (E.O. ) is submitted to the NAVPRO for
engineering review, say for a change of a resistance value
in an electrical system micro circuit, it will be reviewed
for functionality. If the change appears to be technically
compatible, the document wi I 1 be signed off. The plant then
views t h i s signature as concurrence for a Class 1 I authori-
zation. Figure 11 illustrates this interface for an EJS.
A specific example will sketch additional issues related
to the Interchangeable and Replaceable (I&R) specifications
outlined in M I L-STD-8500C . If the contract specifies that an
item have total i n ter changeab i 1 i ty , it means that the item,
when taken from one aircraft, must fit and function on any
other aircraft within the same supportability- profile (same
lot number). Inability of the contractor to meet this
specification requires an authorized deviation.
Many access doors and panels on the FA-18 are made of a
graphite/epoxy composite material. The case in point is a
composite door assembly drawing submitted for Class 11
approval on an E.O. The E.O. stipulated that the item would
be a trim to fit item and therefore Replaceable rather than
Interchangeable as ca 1 led out in the spec. For the NAVPRO
engineer, it was functionally correct and technically
suitable. Therefore, the E.O. was signed off and the plant
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Unfortunately, a Replaceable designation increases the spare
parts profile in the field, which impacts Life Cycle Cost.
Additionally, because of the Class 11 authorization, support
activities responsible for provisioning of spares have no
visibility of the change, therefore demands for this item
from operational units are unfilled and become a readiness
degrader. (Ref. 22)
The extreme end of this process exists at the second and
third tier vendor level. At this level, interface splits
into two distinct categories; Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE) and Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE). For CFE/FA-
18 interfaces, it is MCA I R policy that all subcontractor
changes including Class ll's and minor deviations and
waivers be submitted to and reviewed by a MCA 1
R
representative for evaluation and approval. (Ref. 16:p. 45-
47) GFE/FA-18 interfaces are best described by the FA-18
Configuration Management Plan which states:
MCA 1 R wil I participate with the Navy in the management of
the interfaces between the F-18 aircraft and major GFE
through requirements imposed by Associate Contractor
Agreements (ACA's) and/or Interface Program Plans (IPP's),
to the extent that such requirements are incorporated in
the prime contract between the Government and MCA I R and
the prime contracts between the Government and the
Government Furnished Aircraft Equipment (GFAE) suppliers.
(Ref. 16:p. 41)
Again, the primary focus is on the contract. Program inter-
faces and data transfer must be well defined contractually
if CM is to effectively integrate GFE and CFE into the
weapon system program.
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In summary, there is a strong appeal tor the short term
gain available through application of so called Class II
changes which are in reality Class 1 changes. The short term
benefits are real but they do not come free. Under the
present system, it is possible for a subtle change with a
Class II authorization to generate a new failure mode. The
new failure mode in turn may stimulate an increased discrep-
ancy rate. The new discrepancy rate could affect the spares
profile and/or the maintenance philosophy. A new or
additional piece of Support Equipment may be required along
with a concurrent long term 1 LS impact. This domino effect
carries with it substantial unprogrammed costs reflected in
a variety of configurations, suppor tab i I i ty problems,
maintenance difficulties and degraded readiness.
D. SOFTWARE BREAKOUT
The concept of competition is the very foundation of our
free market economic system. The underlying principle is
simply that a competitive environment influences individuals
and organizations to excel. The competition in Contracting
Act of 1984 (PL98-369) as well as FAR 7 . 000 emphasize that
ful 1 and open competition is considered standard. More
specifically, DOD Directive 5000.1 states that:
.effective design and price competition for defense
systems shall be obtained to the maximum practical extent
to ensure that defense systems are cost-effective and
responsive to mission needs. (Ret. 4:p. 4-30)
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A technique often utilized by program managers to reduce
costs in the later phases of a program is to insert competi-
tion for ancillary logistics elements such as Support Equip-
ment. This type of maneuver is known in acquisition parlance
as "breakout" (i.e. breakout of specific items from the
prime contractor). History records frequent use of the tech-
nique to breakout expensive logistic items from the prime
contractor in an attempt to lower overall program costs. The
A
-
7 program lone of the two aircraft that t FA-18 is
designated to replace), provides a case in point.
Late in the A-? program, avionics sophistication took a
major jump from the A-7A and B models to the A-7D and E
models. It was estimated that as much as seven million
dot lars might be saved by breaking out the GSE for a variety
ot equipment ranging from anti-skid brake test sets to the
advanced test equipment required to provide complex avionics
diagnostics and maintenance. While the intent was good, the
result was an unfavorable logistics situation generating
unprogrammed costs. The problems in the A-7 case were two
fold. First, specifications and control documents were
inadequate and incomplete. Second, the procuring agencies
failed to apply MIL-STD-480 in the contracts. Consequently,
and functional interfaces were not we 1 I defined, equipment
publications were not accurate and Support Equipment
configurations were out of control. (Ref. 20: p. 27) As of
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November 1975, mi 1 1 ions ot do 1 lars and much time had been
spent in an effort to regain control. The publication and
data review alone involved nearly 4U00 drawings. Significant
costs were added to the program rather than the anticipated
savings. A similar situation occurred in the FA-18 program
when an attempt was made to break out very expensive, state
of the art support equipment in the name of competition, to
help reduce what was thought to be excessive developmental
costs and overall program costs. The results of the
Competitive Test Program Set (TPS) Acquisition Program was a
series of developmental problems, delivery schedule slips,
interface problems and cost over runs, al 1 having a
significant impact on program management. In fact, the FA-18
Program Manager (PM) lists the following FA-18 program
impacts as attributable directly to the competitive TPS
initiative:
- Decreased overall operational support flexibility
- Delayed implementation of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
commi tment
Increased interim support costs - O&MN and APN
- Precluded identification and execution of a planned
interim support program
- Exacerbated spares shortages
- Delayed organic Intermediate and Depot level maintenance
- Delayed support of Support Equipment
- Increased reliance on contractor maintenance service
(Ref. 23)
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The first competitive TPS contract awarded in 1983 took 18
months to execute. Costs for the competitive TPS endeavor up
to 1985 were placed at 82.2 million dollars and 98 million
dollars for interim support costs while the TPS's were being
developed. (Ref.23) The FA-18 APML had this to say:
Competitive procurement of TPS's has been neither timely
nor cost effective. Although the decision to compete the
FA-18 TPS's was made in mid CY-81, not a single production
TPS had been delivered to the fleet by Harris GSSD or
Sperry (Hercules) by November 1986. If competitive
procurement is to be applied successfully in the procure-
ment ot TPS's, it must be competed through the prime
contractor. This is the principle lesson learned by the
FA-18 community. After completion of the development
effort, NAVA1R can compete the recurring or do a first
tier breakout of fol low-on procurements. Al 1 the tools of
alternative acquisition must be in place before initiating
a breakout action. (Ref.24:p.2)
Premature breakout is counter productive. Reasons for this
are primarily management and availability of data, however,
the PM states that an overly optimistic initial schedule
failed to fully account for factors such as:
- Clearly defined Automatic Test Equipment (ATE)
sof tware/hardware speci f icat ion,
- Availability of ATE,
- Unstable design of several prime avionics,
- Non-availability of complete technical data package
(proprietary data/complexity)
,
- Non-availability of integration assets (units under
test- UUT' s)
,
Interface problems between prime avionics and TPS
deve 1 opers
,
- Additional administrative (contract) delays associated
with competitive program,
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- Poor contractor performance (redesign of test
strategies). (Ref.23)
He further states that a realistic schedule would have
a I 1 owed f or
:




- Orderly implementation of interim support workarounds,
- More support trade-off options available at cost
effective price. (Ref. 23)
The recommendations made by the FA-18 PM for the acquisition
and support of support equipment are worth looking at
because they not only reemphasize most of the issues
previously discussed, but also signify an awareness that if
passed on to future program managers should help preclude or
at least limit a recurrence of the breakout problem:
- Review the acquisition and support implementation to
ensure (1) a comprehensive systems approach, and (2) a
corresponding management / or gan i zat i ona 1 structure.
- Plan and execute the plan.
- Provide realistic delivery schedules (recognize, plan
and execute interim support program.
Ensure availability of GFE requirements to
developing agencies (data, UUT's, SE, etc).
the
.-. Ensure effective associate contractor agreements
are implemented up front.
- Ensure future support equipment development contracts
include incentive and penalty clauses to preclude/
minimize major scheduling deviations or technical risk.




- Include provisions to efficiently accommodate changes
into support equipments and UUT's as a result of ECP's.
- Support of ATE during integration phase must be fully
funded up front to minimize ATE down time.
- Breakout cost savings must include cost of additional
interim support during the interim support period.
(Ret. 23)
The Navy Program Manager's Guide preaches prudence when
introducing competition during or just prior to the produc-
tion and deployment phase. Experience has repeatedly shown
that the government's interests are best served when the PM
takes the time and incurs the cost necessary to assure a
demonstrated compatibility between any new source and the
design disclosure before that source is a I lowed to manufac-
ture articles for the service inventory. The PM should
realize that when the design drawings, processes, proce-
dures, and other documents necessary for the transfer of the
production of a sophisticated piece of hardware are dupli-
cated and transferred from one contractor to another, there
is probably more knowledge and understanding of how to
produce the article that is left behind in the minds and
hands of the active producer than is obtained in the
transferred material. Learning curves in production programs
are not idle concepts. They are facts of production lite
and, as such, must be reckoned with. (Ref. 7:p. 4-35)
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E. SAFETY AND READINESS
The FA- 18 made its first flight, in November, 19/8. Since
that time, the project has achieved fruition as FA-18's are
deployed world wide. Maintenance technicians at the
Organizational, Intermediate and Depot levels of maintenance
perform preventive and corrective maintenance on the air-
craft, its W R A * s and related SRA's. By definition,
Integrated Logistic Support ( I LS ) planning has its focus at
this level. Indeed, 1 LS is defined as a management function
that :
.provides the initial planning, funding and controls
which help to assure that the ultimate consumer (or user)
will receive a system that will not only meet performance
requirements, but one that can be expeditiously and
economical ly supported throughout its programmed I ife
cycle. A major objective is to assure the integration of
the various elements of support (.i.e., test, and support.
equipment, spare/repair parts, etc. ). (Ret. 21:p. 11-12)
Any break in the intricate management chain described
previously has a major impact on the support of the aircraft
and its systems. This is especial ly true when one considers
the rapid turn around times required to operate from an
aircraft carrier where missed sorties can have very grave
consequences.
Configuration management and control manifests itselr a\
the maintenance technician (user) level in the form of a
part number (P/N) assigned to a specific repairable or
nonrepa l r ab 1 e item. A P/N is a number that enables one item
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to be distinguished from another part numbered item. When
the part number is preceded by the design activity code it
is referred to as the "part identification" and is the
primary reference to source drawings and specifications. It
is important to note that while the part number has a direct
relationship to a particular design activity, the design
activity may not be the manufacturer of the configuration
item. This presents an interesting tracking problem,
especial ly in the case of Class I I engineering changes.
By definition, P/N's would not be altered for a Class II
change because this would require a publication change.
According to MIL-STD-480, any publication change forces an
engineering change into the Class I ECP category (see
Appendix B). The relevant question is; if a Class 11 change
of any significance has been authorized (perhaps when it
should have been a Class 1 ECP) how does the P/N,
maintenance publications or any other logistic element get
mod i f led to reflect the altered parameters and show proper
applicability? This question is of special concern to the
maintenance technician who orders a part from a maintenance
manual according to what is known as a "usab I e -on -code" . The
useab 1 e-on-code provides the technician visibility as to
which P/N applies to the particular configuration of air
craft, WRA or SRA he is working on. The P/N information from
a Class 1 I change is passed to NAVAIR and ASO via a Design
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Change Notice (DCN). The DCN is the MIL-STD-100
authorization document lor a P/N change. When ASU receives a
DCN it will update the ASO data tile. Unfortunately, the
information stops at ASO and the DCN is not passed to the
Naval Aviation Technical Services Facility (NATSF) to update
the publications. The reason tor t h i s is that by definition,
a Class 11 change should not require alterations to
pub 1 i ca t 1 ons
.
A typical scenario is one in which the technician orders
an appropriate part specified in his maintenance manual (in
this case a repairable). When the order is received by the
supply organization servicing h i s area, and an issue cannot
be made, the request is forwarded to ASO where it is cross
referenced with the ASO data base. Occasional ly, the ASO
data base will alter the order with a modified P/N based on
information they have received from NAVA1R via the DCN. The
modification may be subtle such as a dash number change. In
addition, it is not uncommon for the ASO item manager to be
in direct contact with the prime contractor or have access
to a contractor data base usually because there is six
months to a year time delay for change documentation to get
to ASO. The MCA I R data base utilized by the FA- 18 Weapon
System Manager at ASO is ca 1 led the Technical Requirements
Inventory Management (TRIM) System. TRIM allows the item
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manager to plan ahead in procuring the latest item (it also
implies that the Navy system is inadequate and cannot
provide timely information). The item manager will then
instigate an issue of the most up to date item with the
latest applicable dash number. The technician now has a
critical decision to make since he does not have visibility
of the Class 1 I documention that the ASO item manager has.
The technician is governed by his publications and any
deviations from his publications increases his liability.
Consequently, he visualizes a safety of flight issue in the
disparity of information he is receiving. The item he
received may look like the one he needs, but he does not
know what is inside. He does not know if the item he
received from supply will function properly in the item he
is working on. He will attempt to verify the correctness of
the information by asking specific technical questions of
ASO, usual ly of the item manager who is not technical ly
qualified to answer these questions. The search for
verification is on as the aircraft remains "not mission
capable". The Type Commanders and the Functional Wing
Commanders get actively involved due to the readiness issue.
A great deal of time and energy are expended trying to
verify the applicability of the errant P/N. The search
final ly culminates in a discussion with the MCA I R engineer
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who has cognizance over the part in 'question. He is the onlv
person who can speak know i ed geab I y about what changes have
actual ly taken place in the part and how those changes wi 1 I
interface with the rest of the system. This conversation
usual ly takes place via a MCA1R on site technical
representative.
Fortunately, within the NAVPRO organization at MCAIR,
one individual has assumed the responsibility of researching
these issues. He has establ ished a rapport with the
engineering department within MCAIR and has formulated an
independent data base to assist the fleet in resolving these
types of documentation disparities. This type of hands on
approach is expensive, but necessary due to the inadequacy
of the configuration accounting system utilized by the Navy.
Inadequate because in its present form, it does not provide
the information required by the fleet (user activities),
does not track at the Class II level and does not interface
we 1 I with other documentation or data generating activity.
F. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Within NAVAIR, there are two primary Management Informa-
tion Systems (MIS's) prescribed for recording and
maintaining changes to equipment in the NAVA 1 R inventory.
These two systems are the Technical Directive Status
Accounting (TDSA) System and the Naval Aviation Logistics
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Data Analysis (NALDA) System. The TDSA System is designed to
encompass all weapon systems, missiles, engines, trainers,
support equipment, and repairable components under NAVA1R
cognizance. (.Ref. 5) The NALDA System which incorporates
much of the TDSA data, is an analysis system and not a data
col lection system. It receives maintenance, supply,
configuration, operations, material, safety, readiness and
other logistics data from existing data collection systems
such as the Maintenance Data Collection System, the Naval
Aviation Maintenance Program ( N AMP )
,
ASO, Master Data Files,
Weapons System File, Naval Aviation Depots and many other
sources. As a data base management system, its principal
function is to edit and organize input data, then load and
subsequently update the data bank. In addition, it can
calculate various statistical data, develop graphics,
perform simulations and provide various modeling and
forecasting outputs. (Ref. 25:p. 47-59)
Both of these systems provide information after the
entire ECP process has been completed and neither of these
systems track Class 11 engineering changes. Therefore,
logistics planning is always either lead time away, or not
visible at all. In addition, the Naval Audit Service
reported in 1978:
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The TDSA System, designed to provide the current
configuration ot all Naval aircraft and approved
modifications to be installed, is replete with incomplete
and unreliable data. As a result, the system output is not
reliable without extensive reconciliation. (Ref. 26)
In 1982, the Naval Audit Service reported that the Naval Air
Systems Command and the Naval Supply Systems Command:
.still have not agreed on how to carry out and
implement a configuration status accounting program and
that management within the Department of the Navy has not
resolved the problem. (Ref. 27)
Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet studied
fifty -eight configuration related mishaps that occurred
during the eighteen month period ending 30 June 1978. The
study found that the Navy incurred over $100 mi 1 1 ion in
aircraft damage during that period as a result of
inadvertant aircraft component removal, change removal,
instal lation of incompatible replacement components and
failure to incorporate authorized changes. (Ref. 26)
The most significant evolutionary system being developed
is the Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management
Information System (NALCOMIS). It is being designed to
provide Naval aviation activities with an automated
configuration status accounting system, but there is no
credible schedule indicating when NALCOMIS will be
implemented. (Ref. 2S:p. 64-65) Consequently, a
proliferation of independent systems have been developed at
various management levels throughout the Navy. Within the
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FA-18 program, several such systems have been created to
help stabilize the configuration control problem.
The primary source of FA-18 configuration information is
the TRIM System developed by MCA1R. It is updated rapidly,
ref lects both Class I and Class I 1 change data and can be
accessed via a desk top micro computer. While this system
was not considered necessary and therefore not purchased by
the Navy, it is interesting to note that it is now utilized
throughout the FA-18 program, is considered the source lor
configuration data and is even deployed aboard aircraft
carriers. Each organization wishing to access TRIM must now
contract individual ly with MCAIR. The systems main shortfal I
is that it does not track change compliance by aircraft
bureau number or WRA serial number. Other systems are being
developed to fill this gap.
Several independent systems are in use or being
developed within program management offices in an effort to
extract specific information for individual use. Most of
these systems utilize desk top computers and some type of
"oft the shelf" data base management system. Input to these
systems is labor intensive and consumes a great deal of a
managers time. However, managers see a need that is not
filled by present Navy systems. They perceive the cost
to be relatively low for the benefit of having specific
information readily available. At the NETD, a system
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called Configuration, Update and Report (GUAR) is being
developed. The key motivations behind this system are
initially to establish an ability to track ECP compliance
and to anticipate the ECP process in order to shorten
logistics lead time. For input data, the system currently
utilizes the MCAIR ECP tile which is provided periodically
as part of the CDRL. This allows the NESO to update the CUAR
data base, study ECP's while they are being developed and to
plan for relevent logistics support. CUAR is a relational
data base system and files can be accessed by bureau number,
type/mode 1 / ser i es (TMS> or ECP number. The system can be
utilized to provide the exact aircraft configuration for
deploying squadrons as an aid in the deployment provisioning
process. Future applications of the system will be to
capture Class II data and provide the much needed visibility
of these changes. CUAR data can be accessed via a desk top
computer with updates provided per iodi ca liy by mail, or GUAR
could easily be networked to provide more real time
configuration information to Functional Wings and Type
Commanders
.
While the proliferation of independent systems serves an
integral need for the users of these systems, they lack
overall coordination, integration and standardization.
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V. CONCLUS 1 ON
_
AND RECQMMENDAT 1 ONS
A. SUMMARY
DOD Configuration Management and Control goals and
objectives I isted»in chapter one are sound. A determination
as to the costs and benefits of meeting these objectives was
the aspiration of this thesis. Clearly, attempts to reduce
life cycle costs by constraining the tools, techniques and
procedures customarily utilized to achieve the CM
objectives, will derive only a limited short term benefit
while generating detrimental long range costs. Indeed, more
substantial savings can be realized and significant long
term gains achieved through dynamic technical management
practices and use of program resources. In effect, an
increased expenditure on CM early in the program, should
reduce I LS costs downstream. Of the critical CM elements,
Configuration Identification and Accounting programs (on the
government side) seem to lag behind for the various reasons
addressed in the body of this thesis. As weapon systems
become more sophisticated, complex and integrated,
configuration status accounting and tracking become
essential to suppor tab i 1 1 ty . The proliferation of
independent accounting systems including those purchased
from manufacturers is a deplorable situation indicative of a
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breakdown in the Navy acquisition economy. The acquisition
strategy plays a major role in how the CM objectives are
achieved. While the strategy selected by the Program Manager
(PM) will introduce many self imposed constraints, through
such concepts as concurrency or the implementation of
delayed competition through breakout, it is imperative that
the PM consider the strategy impact on Configuration Manage-
ment and Control. He must look beyond the complaisant
attitudes nurtured by the clerical and administrative as-
pects of CM incorporated through contractual stipulations,
and focus on the technical management aspects necessary to
identify and accommodate al I of the Integrated Logistics
Support elements.
The FA-18 Program has fulfilled the letter and intent of
DOD and DON Configuration Management and Control policies.
In areas where insufficient guidance or unusual
circumstances evolved to create untenable CM obstacles,
program management responded readily and surpassed existing
policies by implementing extraordinary workarounds to ensure
program success. Unfortunately, many of these workarounds
carry considerable costs.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of the research conducted for this
thesis, it can be said that the Navy's CM program has not
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effectively controlled the product baseline for ail
designated FA-18 configuration items. The following
conclusions are stated in response to the primary and
secondary research questions:
1. The complexity of configuration control problems have
out stripped the present system's ability to handle
them. The present system is inadequate and unable to
capture the current fast paced, high technology
environment. Indeed, changes that could have a
substantial impact on system suppor tab i I i ty can be
made with alarming speed. The proliferation of
local ly developed systems designed to capture the
dynamic environment of CM lack overal 1 coordination,
integration and standardization.
2. Given the state of the art in terms of Computer
Assisted Design (CAD) and Computer Assisted
Manufacturing (CAM), it is likely that private
industry has a better grasp on technical management,
especial ly in the uti 1 ization of management
information systems for tracking a technical data
base 1 i ne
.
3. The Program Manager has ultimate responsibility and
authority for configuration management. It is
doubtful, however, that he has adequate tools and
expertise at his disposal to perform the CM function.
Fragmentation of the approval process, and delegation
of authority, particularly in the area of Class 1
1
engineering changes, sidesteps the LSA process and
obscures suppor tab i 1 i ty issues. In addition, the
discipline of CM does not have a well defined career
path. A high turn over rate of personnel within
government technical management exacerbates this
prob 1 em
.
4. The system is too cumbersome to al low effective and
efficient information flow. While the concept of
"Acquisition Streamlining" aspires to cut back the
amount of contractual ly required data, the requirement
for transfer of a complete and accurate Technical Data
Package (TDP) is valid and likely to intensify.
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5. It is not likely that prime contractors or second and
third tier vendors circumvent the system to avoid what
they perceive as bureaucratic bottlenecks. It is
likely, however, that they use the ambiguities in the
system to avoid the additional expense of Class I ECP
justification and processing where possible.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above
recommendations are made:
cone I us 1 ons
,
the following
1. Undertake a program to identify and coordinate
existing data bases relevant to CM. A means of
integrating pertinent information and making it
available for all DOD Configuration Managers should be
de ve 1 oped
.
2. Expedite the implementation of NALCOM I S if it is to be
the ultimate Configuration Status Accounting tool.
Implementation should include provisions for up line
reporting to Functional Wings, Carrier Air Wings and
Type Commanders.
3. In the absence of a coherent DOD CM system, Program
Managers should undertake a long term cost/benefit
analysis as to the purchase of a CM system from the
prime contractor that would effectively and
efficiently integrate the technical data baseline of
their specific program with DOD CM systems.
4. Review MIL-STD-480 for ambiguities, variability and
expediency in the classification of engineering
changes. In the area of Class I I changes, provide
specific guidelines for the review and reporting of
Class II changes. Reinforce the use of Class I ECP' s.
It may be possible to provide some middle ground for
Plant Representatives to work in such as a do 1 lar
ceiling approval authority for certain Class I ECP's
to encourage proper reporting of changes and to help
expedite the process.
5. Provide training and establish a career path for
professional Configuration Managers. An engineering
background or demonstrated expertise in technical or
engineering management should be preferred for al 1
candidates. Logistics training to include
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familiarization of I LS and the LSA process should also
be provided to government engineers tasked with the
review of engineering changes.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Fo I low on research may be desired in the fol lowing
areas : *
1. A review of all ongoing Navy and/or DOD acquisition
and procurement programs to identify and document the
many different approaches to CM currently in use.
Research in this area should include a detailed
assessment ot MIS.
2. Review in detail the NALCOMIS module designed to
assume the configuration management, control,
identification and accounting functions to determine
it it will be capable of performing CM integration and
analysis in order to provide the critical
suppo r tab i 1 i ty information.
3. Review in detail all instructions, directives and
regulations, in an effort to streamline the change
approval process. Make recommendations to higher
authority regarding reorganization of and improvements
to the present system.
4. Perform a cost/benefit analysis to identify the
tradeoffs of a government developed CM program as
opposed to one developed by a prime contractor for a




[Ref . 5:p. B-l ]
1. DOD Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition of Major Defense
Sy s terns"
This directive establishes policy for major defense
system acquisition in the Military Departments and
Defense Agencies. The management principles in this
Directive are appli cab le to all programs ( ma jor and
others) .
2. DOD Manual 4120. 3-M, "Standardization Policies, Proce-
dures and Instructions"
The standardization provisions of this manual apply
to DOD items and related engineering practices,
processes, services and documentation which support the
functions of design, development, procurement,
production, inspection, supply, maintenance and repair.
Chapter V, "Outline of Form and Instructions for the
Preparation of Specifications and Associated Documents"
is particularly applicable to configuration
identification inasmuch as it addresses the preparation
of Federal and Military specifications.
3. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
The single uniform acquisition regulation for al
I
Federal executive agencies. It applies to all Federal
acquisitions of property and services with appropriated
t unds
.
4. MIL-D-1000, "Drawings, Engineering and Associated Lists"
This specification prescribes the general requirements
for preparing engineering drawings and associated lists.
It requires the acquisition of engineering drawings in
one or more specified Intended Use Categories and
prepared in one of three Forms. Both category and form
must be specified.
5. MlL-S-83490, "Specification, Types and Forms"
This specification prescribes general requirements for
preparing specifications for DOD Components. It defines
types and forms of specifications and shows their normal
usage in the various program phases.
6. M1L-STD-XXX, "Configuration Management Practices for
Defense Materiel Items" (To Be Published)
This standard prescribes basic configuration management
practices and is the basic document for contractual ly
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implementing a configuration management program. It
covers the general requirements for configuration
management not covered in the other, more specific and
detailed military standards. It also contains defini-
tions of configuration management terms.
7. M 1 L-STD- 100, "Engineering Drawing Practices"
This standard prescribes procedures and format
authorized for Form 1 and Form 2 drawings and associated
lists prepared by or for DOD as prescribed by M1L-D-
1000.
8. Ml L-STD -130, "Identification Marking of U.S. Military
Proper ty
"
This standard establishes the item marking requirements
for identification purposes as required in stocking and
replacing parts, sub-assemblies, assemblies, units, sets
and all other items of military proper ty required by the
DOD, with recognition of certain delimitations.
9. M I L-STD-480, "Configuration Control-Engineering Changes,
Deviations and Waivers"
This standard prescribes procedures and format
authorized for preparing an engineering change proposal
(ECP). A complete analysis of the implementation impact
of the ECP is required with the ECP, containing a
description of all known interface effects and
information concerning changes required in the
configuration identification. Considerable supporting
data is required for impact analysis upon integrated
logistic support as we I 1 as overal 1 estimated cost
i mpact
.
10. MlL-STD-481, "Configuration Control -Engineering Changes,
Deviations and Waivers (Short Form)"
This standard prescribes procedures and format
authorized for preparing an abbreviated engineering
change proposal (ECP). It requires limited supporting
data and is used on contracts for mul ti-appl ication
items or procurement from contractors who cannot know
all the consequences of an engineering change.
Therefore, the Government does most of the impact
ana 1 ys i s
.
11. MIL-STD-482, "Configuration Status Accounting Data
Elements and Related Features"
This standard prescribes status accounting data
elements, interim (non-standard) data elements and their
related data items, codes, use identifiers and data
cha i ns
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12. M1L-STD-490, "Specification Practices"
This standard sets forth practices for preparing,
interpreting, changing and revising program peculiar
specifications prepared by or for DOD components. It
establishes uniform specifications practices comparable
to the engineering drawing practices of M I L -STD~ 100
.
13. DD Form 633-5, "Contract Pricing Proposal (Change
Older)"
This form provides a standard format by which the con-
tractor submits to Government a summary of incurred and
estimated costs (.and attached supporting information)
suitable for detailed review and analysis.
14. DD Form 1423, "Contract Data Requirements List"
This form provides for the listing of data items
required to be delivered under the contract.
15. DD Form 1634, "Research and Development Planning
Summa r y
"
This form provides for a uniform format for initiating
and reporting information needed in reviewing and
approving DOD research and development programs.
16. DD Form 1664, "Data Item Description"
This form describes a data item which the contractor
to deliver to the Government.
1 s
17. DD Form 1692, "Engineering Change Proposals"
This form provides a comprehensive, standard format for
submitting proposed engineering changes.
18. Catalog Handbook H4-1, "Federal Supply Code for Manufac-
turers"
The Federal Supply Code for Manufacturers (FSCM) is a
coding system of numbers assigned to establishments
which are manufacturers of have design control of items
of supply procured by agencies of the Federal Government
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APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST FOR CLASSIFY 1 NG ENGINEERING CHANGES
(In Accordance with M I L-STD- 480A
)
[Ref. 7:p. IV-B-1)
This Checklist is to be used to classify engineering changes
to any hardware specified for control in the contract in
accordance with M1L-STD-480A, paragraph 4.2.1.
The check sheet statements apply to the lowest level
specified by base line identified in the PCI (Product
Configuration Identification) as established in the contract.
Place a check ( ) in the appropriate YES or NO column for
items 1 through 16. A check in the YES column indicates the
change is Class I whereas no checks in the YES column
indicates the change is Class II.
YES NO Are any of the factors listed below
af f ect ed :
1 . Thefuncti ona 1 or allocated configura-
tion (contract SPECIFICATION for func-
tional or allocated base line).
2. The product configuration identifica-
tion as contractually specified, (or as




The TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS listed below
contained in the product configuration
identification, including referenced
drawings, as contractually specified
(or as applied to Government
act i v i t i es ) :
(a) Performance (outside stated tolerance).
( b ) Re 1 i ab i I i t y , ma inta i na b i I l t. y or
survivability (outside stated
to 1 erance ) .


















Fee, incentive, or cost.
Schedules.
Guarantees or deliveries.






or ma i n t enance
Compatibility with support equipment,
trainers or training devices/equipment.
Configuration to the extent that retro-
fit action would be taken.
Delivered operation and maintenance
manuals for which change / re v i s i on
funding is not on existing contracts.
Pre-set adjustments or schedules
affecting operating limits or
performance to such extent as to
require assignment of a new
identification number.
I nter changeab i 1 i ty , subs t i t utab i
1
i ty or
r ep 1 aceab i 1 i
t
y , as applied to
configuration items (CI ' s) , and to all
subassemblies and parts of repairable
CI's, excluding the pieces and parts of
non-repairable subassemblies.
Sources of CI's or repairable items at
any level defined by source control
draw i ngs
.
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